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Abstract
Image schemas have been proposed as conceptual building blocks corresponding to the
hypothesised most fundamental embodied experiences. We formally investigate how
combinations of image schemas (or ‘image schematic profiles’) can model essential
aspects of events, and discuss benefits for artificial intelligence and cognitive systems
research, in particular concerning the role of such basic events in concept formation.
More specifically, as exemplary illustrations and proof of concept the image schemas
OBJECT, CONTACT, and PATH are combined to form the events BLOCKAGE, BOUNC-
ING, and CAUSED MOVEMENT. Additionally, an outline of a proposed conceptual
hierarchy of levels of modelling for image schemas and similar cognitive theories is
given.
Keywords: Image schemas, Cognitive primitives, Concept formation, Formal
modelling, Cognitive systems
Introduction
Already remarkably early during their cognitive development, children are able to
reason about cause and effect on object relations and can also conceptualise simple
events (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006). This capacity comes about long before the devel-
opment of language, and before both social or mathematical understanding becomes5
part of the individual’s capacities. Even in the first stages of cognitive development hu-
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mans are capable to predict the outcome of objects’ interactions in simple events. For
example, a child early on registers that dropped objects will fall to the floor. It seems
absurd that this realisation might be based on a sufficiently complete mathematical un-
derstanding of the physics behind gravity (the presence of which is quite doubtful even10
in grown adults). Instead, the prediction is more likely rooted in a simplified concep-
tualisation of gravity, or rather, the experienceable effects of gravity learned by some
form of ‘statistical inference’ conducted over the child’s sensorimotor experiences and
relevant observations from the environment.
Embodied theories of cognition aim to explain how this type of conceptualisation15
comes about, emphasising sensorimotor processes as a crucial foundation of cognitive
development and concept formation (Shapiro, 2011). At present it remains largely
unknown how this supposed embodied experience manifests in detail, for example
whether as mental representations (Barsalou, 2008) or as neural activations in corre-
sponding areas in the sensorimotor cortex (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). Still, while there20
are conflicting views regarding to which degree cognition indeed is or has to be em-
bodied, there is growing agreement that in practice the body’s interaction with the en-
vironment is a determining factor in the development of an understanding of the world
and in the emergence of concepts. This position receives increasing support by inde-
pendent findings from several disciplines, including cognitive linguistics, psychology,25
and neuroscience (cf., for instance, the work by Tettamanti et al. (2005); Feldman &
Narayanan (2004); Wilson & Gibbs (2007); Louwerse & Jeuniaux (2010)).
Already for reasons of reasoning and representation efficiency—as well as due to
the expectable complexity of a theory formation process based on observations from
the environment, rather than on experimentation in a scientific setup—it appears un-30
likely that embodied experiences would mentally manifest as full-fledged theories, in a
mathematical sense modelling and explaining the underlying physics of object manip-
ulation. Instead, it seems much more plausible to assume that embodied experiences
are used as basis for an abstraction process into generic building blocks, discarding
much of the instance-specific and fine-grained information. One approach that aims35
to capture these abstracted experiences is the theory of image schemas (see Hampe
& Grady (2005) for an overview). It suggests that (part of) the embodied experience
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can be explained using a set of spatio-temporal object relations, with CONTAINMENT,
SUPPORT, LINK and PATH-following serving as classical examples. These and similar
image schemas are then investigated, among others, in how they manifest in psycholog-40
ical development (Mandler, 2004) and language constructions and acquisition (Hampe
& Grady, 2005). Also, for Oakley (2010) ‘image schematic profiles’ represent how
conceptualisations of events can be described using combinations of image schemas.
Starting out from a similar intuition, the present article constitutes a first step in
the investigation of the process with which image schematic abstractions can, when45
combined with one another, actually model simple events (formally). This question is
approached from a conceptual level, but also from a formal and computational level
with the motivation that modelling image schematic combinations may aid the devel-
opment of event comprehension in artificial intelligence (AI). For this purpose, the al-
ready mentioned PATH-following schema (hypothesised as one of the most basic image50
schemas) is combined with other basic image schemas to illustrate how a conceptuali-
sation of events such as ‘blockage’, ‘bouncing’ and ‘caused movement’ may develop.
In the next section, “Theoretical and conceptual foundations”, we summarise essential
parts of the theory of image schemas and clarify some basic concepts relevant in the
context of this article, as well as in the study of image schemas in general. Building on55
these conceptual foundations, the section “Formally combining image schemas” then
presents the main contribution, namely a (computationally usable) formal model of the
combination of several primitive image schemas into a more complex schema. Also,
and of equal importance, an initial proposal for a hierarchy of several different levels of
models (corresponding to different granularities of conceptualisation and explanation)60
for notions from the context of cognitive theorising, such as image schemas and simi-
lar phenomena, is put forward. Section “Conclusions and future work” then concludes
the article, summarising what has been achieved and outlining future work towards a
comprehensive formal and computational theory of image schemas applicable also in
AI and cognitive systems.65
3
Theoretical and conceptual foundations
In this section, we introduce the necessary concepts from basic image schema the-
ory as developed in previous studies on image schemas, and also clarify the intended
meaning of several central notions relevant in this context. Before focusing on image
schemas proper, we therefore start with a working definition of the notion of “event”.70
Conceptualising “events” in the context of image schemas
Throughout this article, events are to be understood as defined, for instance, by
Galton (2012). For our purposes an event therefore “(...) is a temporally bounded oc-
currence typically involving one or more material participants undergoing motion or
change, usually with the result that at least one partipant [sic!] is in a different state75
at the end of the event from the beginning”.1 This notion of event is also well-suited
to an embedding in the context of narratives (which are to be understood as reports of
connected events presented in a sequential manner as mental images, written or spo-
ken words, visual scenes, and/or similar), particularly when allowing for participants
that only exhibit a ‘derived materiality’. Precluding the more detailed introduction of80
image schemas in the following section, this is of importance since in the context of
cognitive development and concept formation, Mandler & Paga´n Ca´novas (2014) also
conceptualise image schemas from a narrative perspective (and locate them within a
conceptual hierarchy of increasingly complex mental constructs): “Spatial primitives
are the first conceptual building blocks, image schemas are simple spatial stories built85
from them, and schematic integrations use the first two types to build concepts that
include non-spatial elements.”
Introducing image schemas
Simply put image schemas are thought of as generic pre-conceptualisations that
allow us to mentally structure our experiences and perceptions. Supposedly learned90
1The precise ontological nature and status of events has for a long time been, and still is, an open question
and lies outside the focus of the present article. We direct the reader, for instance, to Bach (1986) for a classic
account on the classification of events and their internal structure. Alternative proposals have also been made
by Mourelatos (1981); Mani et al. (2005); van Lambalgen & Hamm (2005), among others.
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from embodied experiences they are often spoken of as object relations situated within
a spatio-temporal dimension.
Important parts of the intuitions and conceptual ideas underlying image schemas
can be traced back already to, among others, the notion of the Kantian ‘schemata’
(Kant, 1998). In Kant’s theory of schemata, the idea of how non-empirical concepts95
could be associated with sensory input was introduced. In the first half of the 20th
century, Piaget (1952) then looked at human development from infancy to adulthood.
According to Piaget, cognitive development goes through four stages before reaching
maturity. The first of these is the “sensorimotor period” in which cognitive under-
standing emerges from sensorimotor experiences. This research hypothesis lies at the100
foundation of embodied theories of cognition (Shapiro, 2011). In the 1970’s, cognitive
linguistics and psycholinguistics gained influence in the cognitive sciences and became
increasingly connected to theories of embodied cognition as the spatial nature of lan-
guage was brought to light. During the last decades, eventually research methods from
neuroscience became increasingly important in answering questions regarding cogni-105
tive phenomena, among others further supporting the main ideas of embodied theories
of cognition (cf. Gallese & Lakoff (2005); Feldman & Narayanan (2004); Aziz-Zadeh
& Damasio (2008), among others).
Against this backdrop, the theory of image schemas was developed and introduced
by Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) simultaneously. Tying back into Piaget’s afore-110
mentioned theories about development during the sensorimotor period, image schemas
are thought to develop in early infancy, as the body physically interacts with and per-
ceives its surroundings. A paradigmatic example is the VERTICALITY (or the UP-
DOWN) image schema. It is thought to develop as a result of the body’s own vertical
axis (Johnson, 1987). Still, as already stated previously, while children quickly learn115
to predict that objects will fall when dropped—a process spatially unfolding mostly
in the vertical dimension—, it is unlikely that they have gained understanding of the
physics behind gravity in any mathematical sense (i.e., having developed a mathemat-
ical theory of gravity and corresponding force dynamics). Instead it is suggested that
the abstracted information presented in image schemas is the cognitive component with120
which infants make predictions about the world.
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Image schemas are often confused to be abstract visual representations, partly due
to the (somewhat unfortunate) terminology and partly due to the proportionally high
representation of vision in our perception. However, as Oakley (2010) points out, “im-
age schemas are neither images nor schemas in the familiar sense of each term as used125
in philosophy, cognitive psychology or anthropology”. Instead, in the same way that
embodied experiences are multimodal, so are image schemas. For instance, auditory
experiences appear more abstract and have therefore a distinct logic and different ex-
pressions than the ones found solely in vision and more concrete situations. As an
example, a piece of music may be “shared” between an audience in a completely dif-130
ferent way than a piece of cake could be. Also, sounds can be shared by multiple
receivers in ways that visually perceived objects may not (and vice versa). The way
we abstract away from auditory experiences might, thus, differ greatly from the cor-
responding process for visually perceived experiences—and similar for other sensory
modalities and/or combinations thereof. It is therefore important to make the distinc-135
tion that image schemas are not simply abstract visual representations but are of a
genuinely different nature and quality.
Due to the complexity of trying to exhaustively identify and pinpoint the essential
abstract image schemas, there is currently no agreed upon list which captures all the
image schemas that are assumed to be involved in human cognition. VERTICALITY,140
mentioned above is only one of many image schemas presented in the literature. Other
commonly mentioned image schemas are, for instance, CONTAINMENT, CONTACT,
SUPPORT and PATH.
The motivation behind image schemas
The idea at the core of image schemas is that with the accumulating experience145
a child has with its environment, image schemas become increasingly fine-tuned and
more specialised for the context (Rohrer, 2005). While there are conflicting definitions
and terminology in the literature regarding image schemas, the general consensus is
that complex image schemas result from combining elements taken from various, sim-
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pler image schemas and image schematic components (Oakley, 2010).2 An example150
of the complexity of each image schema can be found in the work of Hedblom et al.
(2015) where the SOURCE PATH GOAL schema has been broken up into a family of
movement image schemas structured, among other dimensions, along the usage of the
conceptual primitives presented by Mandler & Paga´n Ca´novas (2014).
One motivation for image schemas is the way in which they offer a cognitive ben-155
efit to perform information transfers unto unknown domains. Image schemas model
the skeletal knowledge about a concept that can be analogically transferred between
different domains (encompassing defining features and relations, but leaving aside de-
tails of particular instances). If the image schema CONTAINMENT has been learnt
by exposure to everyday events (such as “embraces”, “entering/exiting” houses, and160
through the simple activity of “eating”), this understanding that “objects can be within
other objects” can be transferred to other situations. Having grasped the notion of
CONTAINMENT the infant—provided it has sufficient knowledge about the involved
objects/domain elements—can predict that water will remain in a glass when poured
therein, that people can be in cars, etc. The corresponding knowledge transfer be-165
comes an essential part of cognition and can, as the cognitive development reaches
increasingly more abstract understanding in early adolescence (Piaget, 1952), provide
a foundation for abstract thought as well. Image schemas can be found to explain ab-
stract concepts in music (Antovic´, 2009; Antovic´ et al., 2013), mathematics (Lakoff &
Nu´n˜ez, 2000), and time (Boroditsky, 2000). Time is particularly interesting as it often170
is viewed as a spatial PATH on which events are perceived as ‘physical’ OBJECTs (van
Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005).
The way image schemas are used to conceptualise abstract concepts is demon-
strated in how image schemas sometimes constitute the transferred information in
metaphors (Ko¨vecses, 2010). More concretely, for example, CONTAINMENT is an175
2These components are a research field in its own, but they are often considered in image schema research
as well. Here, spatial or temporal components construct more complex image schemas. Some influences are
Mandler (1992)’s conceptual primitives, Talmy (2005)’s spatial schemas and Wierzbicka (1996)’s semantic
primes.
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important image schema in the conceptualisation of mental or affective states: “one
can get out of a depression” and “people fall in love”. Likewise, the VERTICALITY
schema is often used to explain points on the emotional scale “happiness/sadness” and
social status, for instance, “to be high in spirit”, “to feel down”, and “to climb the
career ladder”. Another important note is that image schemas can be both static and180
dynamic. From a formal point of view it might be beneficial (i.e. simpler) to focus on
the static image schemas alone. However, this comprises a major simplification and is
not cognitively adequate, as image schemas also essentially model change over time.
The notion of CONTAINMENT is, in its most basic form, defined as the relationship of
an inside, an outside, and a border (Johnson, 1987). Yet, looking at cognitive devel-185
opment, it is not this relationship that the understanding of CONTAINMENT seems to
stem from. Instead, it appears as though the most important grounds for image schema
development lie in the change over time, here the movement IN and OUT of a container
(Mandler & Paga´n Ca´novas, 2014). Mandler & Paga´n Ca´novas (2014) pointed out that
image schemas are “spatial stories” that in early infancy shape cognitive development.190
Conceptually, an image schema can be seen as a kind of generic event (as characterised
above).
Oakley (2010) motivated the role of image schemas in complex conceptualisations
such as “going to the library” by what he called “image schema profiles”. The concep-
tualisation of the scenario is described using a series of image schemas, namely:195
• SOURCE PATH GOAL
• CONTAINMENT
• COLLECTION
• PART WHOLE
• TRANSFER200
• ITERATION
Through conceptualisation of events over time, these image schemas go through “image-
schema transformations”. Building upon these combinations of image schemas to
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model conceptualisation of events—and taking the metaphor of image schemas as cog-
nitive building blocks quite literally—we aim to explain how simple events in early205
infancy may be conceptualised using “image schema combinations” or “image schema
profiles”.3
Work on formalising image schemas
Despite image schemas’ original status as an abstract, cognitive phenomenon work
on developing a theory and corresponding formalisations has become an increasingly210
common sight in the context of cognitively-inspired AI. This is mainly due to the
prospect of image schemas offering a systematic approach for conceptualisation and
concept acquisition based on embodied theories. One major problem, however, is how
to formally represent them in an adequate but still computationally usable way.
Research in AI building on the processing of sensorimotor experiences includes215
connectionist models as, for instance, described by Regier (1996), which learn to clas-
sify visual stimuli into linguistic categories. Similar in approach, but with direct con-
nection to the theory of image schemas, is the work by Nayak & Mukerjee (2012), who
developed a system that, based on video input of OBJECTs moving IN and OUT of con-
tainers, learned the concept of CONTAINMENT. Another system is Dev E-R (Aguilar &220
Perez y Perez, 2015) which models the sensorimotor stages in cognitive development
and fine-tunes its knowledge based on the amount of visual stimuli. More theoretical
investigations of how image schemas are involved in formal domains have been re-
3Presumably, this approach does not have to be restricted to simple events in early infancy. As stated
before, one of the benefits of image schemas lies in their partially generalised nature, which enables transfer
of knowledge or expectations onto novel situations. For instance, if the image schema of SUPPORT has been
learnt through perceptual exposure of “plates on tables”, an infant should have an advantage in inferring that
table-like objects such as “desks” can SUPPORT “books” as well. As the environment becomes increasingly
complex for the infant, this information transfer could become a fundamental part of cognition and concept
understanding. Concepts such as “table” become connected to the SUPPORT image schema, concepts like
“cup” to CONTAINMENT, etc. In this way image schemas can also be conceived to provide a form of model
and representation for affordances (Kuhn, 2007), and also fairly complex social or abstract concepts could
be described by combining image schemas (for example “marriage” could be viewed as a combination of
LINK and PATH (Mandler, 2004)).
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ported by Lakoff & Nu´n˜ez (2000). There they illustrate how image schemas—through
the experience of embodied metaphors—form the foundations for abstract concepts in225
mathematics. Using basic image schematic structures such as the PATH-schema they
suggest how, for instance, basic arithmetic or a notion of rational numbers can mentally
be developed by the child and then, taking into account further experiences and image
schemas, be evolved into increasingly abstract mathematical concepts.
While these and similar efforts demonstrate how the development of abstract con-230
cepts may be approached in a constructive way within the framework of cognitive
science and image schemas, it does not in itself provide any answers on how to for-
mally treat the problem. Frank & Raubal (1999) presented a then up-to-date review of
attempts to formalise image schemas. Among others they discussed the progress repre-
senting them with calculi or in function representations, and also proposed a method on235
how to formally structure image schemas using relation calculus both on a large-scale
and small-scale. Bennett & Cialone (2014) approached the problem from a linguistic
and formal perspective. With the desire to map image schematic language structures
to a logic for ontology development, they searched for synonyms to the CONTAIN-
MENT image schema (contain, surround, enclose, etc.) in a text corpus from biology.240
By relating to the well-known RCC-8 topological relations (Randell et al., 1992), they
identified and formally represented eight different kinds of containers. Fuchs (2013)
also uses the natural sciences as a domain to identify the role of image schemas. In
his work, he outlined how image schemas are involved in narrative by looking closer
at the concept of force as frequently evoked in physics. He motivates his research not245
only by the question of how children learn these abstract concepts in infancy, but also
by how image schema narratives may aid education for adults.
Hedblom et al. (2015) conducted a study that aimed to track the different image
schemas within one family. Looking at the SOURCE PATH GOAL image schema, they
represent a multitude of image schemas within a ‘PATH-family’ (see Figure 1), rather250
than a single individual theory. The interlinking theories were motivated by “spatial and
conceptual primitives” identified from research in developmental psychology (Mandler
& Paga´n Ca´novas, 2014), and expressed in a computationally usable format using the
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DOL4 meta-language (Mossakowski et al., 2015) and an axiomatisation in Common
Logic (ISO/IEC 24707, 2007).255
In a second study by Hedblom et al. (2016), the possibilities of using formalised
image schemas as the conceptual building blocks during formal concept invention were
discussed. The corresponding ideas build on Fauconnier & Turner (1998)’s cognitive
theory of conceptual blending, a theoretical framework for creative thinking in which
novel concepts are developed by means of a selective “merge” of already known con-260
cepts. This theoretical framework for concept invention was further formalised in the
EU FP7 project COINVENT5 (cf. Schorlemmer et al. (2014)) building on a more ab-
stract formal rendering of the ideas underlying blending, cf. Kutz et al. (2010, 2014).
One of the core ideas of Hedblom et al. (2016) in this context was to introduce for-
malised image schemas as a means to control the selection of shared aspects during the265
process of selectively combining the concepts.
The different lines of work described up to this point focused on identifying the
different notions within one image schema, or one image schema family. Another
contribution to the field is the research carried out by Kuhn (2002, 2007). Working
top-down he uses WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998) to extract the image schematic structure270
from expressions and concepts, followed by formally representing the extracted im-
age schemas. Kuhn (2007)’s work was taken up and further developed by Walton &
Worboys (2009) who aimed to express how image schemas are connected to one an-
other and could be combined by visually representing the intersections with bigraphs.
Finally, work that particularly aims to model the events that image schematic combi-275
nations give rise to has been conducted by St. Amant et al. (2006). They introduce
what they call the ‘Image Schema Language’ (ISL) as a formal way to demonstrate
how image schemas link to one another during sequential events. St. Amant and col-
leagues then further developed ISL by integrating it into an artificial system modelling
cognitive development called the ‘Jean System’ (Chang et al., 2006).280
4The DOL language was adopted by the Object Management Group (OMG) in 2016 (DOL FTF-Beta,
2016).
5See http://www.coinvent-project.eu
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Still, in summary it has to be noted that much of the work focusing on formalising
image schemas has been conducted with the intention to model language, and little at-
tention has been devoted to the potential of combinations of image schemas as a model
for events. In what follows, we will look closer at a few particular image schemas and
demonstrate how the combinations of these image schemas gives rise to more complex285
image schemas and simple events. The conceptual demonstration is combined with a
formal logical representation in the section “Formally combining image schemas” in
order to motivate how AI and cognitive systems could put the theory of image schemas
to use in the modelling of events.
The image schemas OBJECT, CONTACT and PATH290
For the purpose of illustrating the just described idea of combining simple image
schemas into more complex ones, the image schemas that will be used in our exam-
ples need proper introductions. The main schemas are OBJECT, CONTACT and PATH-
following.
The first one, OBJECT, basically describing the objecthood of an entity, is con-295
troversial within the research field. The reason for this is that there are inconsistent
views on whether this is an image schema, a spatial primitive, or if this kind of con-
cept even is to be counted as image schematic at all (cf. Santiba´n˜ez (2002)). Regardless,
objects—either as concrete physical entities or in some cases even as abstract notions—
are involved in events and need to be considered when aiming to formally represent the300
latter.
The second important image schema is CONTACT. It consists of two (or more)
objects that are physically touching. Important to distinguish here is that the objects are
not allowed to be dependent on each other from any force dynamic perspective. If they
were to be dependent on each other, two more complex image schemas would come305
into existence: First, if one object depends on another one, it captures the image schema
SUPPORT, and second, if both image schemas depend on each other, this represents a
LINK. CONTACT is spatial in nature, and after having been learnt it does not need to
be temporal or change over time. From a practical point of view all it requires is a time
point (or an interval) t in which the objects are touching.310
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The third and most important image schema for our purposes is PATH-following.
Mandler & Paga´n Ca´novas (2014) define PATH-following in its simplest form as “move-
ment in any trajectory”. Children pay much attention to moving objects, favouring
PATH to be one of the first image schemas to be learnt (Rohrer, 2005). Often when this
image schema is concerned the term SOURCE PATH GOAL is used, implying not only315
a “source” and a “goal” for the movement, but also a particular “trajectory”. Con-
sequently, the PATH-following schema has several layers of complexity. Hedblom
et al. (2015) presented a hierarchical structure and an axiomatisation of the PATH-
following image schema, reproduced in Figure 1. In their hierarchy, the first level
is MOVEMENT OF OBJECT, and when a trajectory is included they call it MOVE-320
MENT ALONG PATH. For the purpose of this paper, MOVEMENT ALONG PATH will
offer a sufficient level of complexity, with an object x, a path or trajectory p, and time
points tn on the path, which—in a simplified way—illustrate the temporal dimension
of the image schema.6
In the following section we will now proceed with discussing and formally illustrat-325
ing how these image schemas may be combined with one another in order to represent
simple events.
Formally combining image schemas
In similarity with how LEGO blocks are combined to generate complex structures,
image schemas can be combined to generate more complex image schemas and conse-330
quently explain increasingly complex scenarios and concepts. This may seem straight-
forward, however, the following two problems need to be addressed.
• A fundamental challenge is to differentiate between image schema combina-
tions and image schema components with atomic structure. This is a non-trivial
problem. Image schemas have a gestalt structure as for each image schema all335
components are essential (Lakoff & Nu´n˜ez, 2000). Using CONTAINMENT as
6In reality, path and trajectory may differ as the path represents the actual movement and the trajectory
the anticipated movement. However, it is unnecessary to make this distinction at this point.
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Figure 1: The Path-following family as presented in Hedblom et al. (2015)
an example, it is not possible to have an “inside” without also considering an
“outside” and a separating “border”. Looking at the cognitive development of
CONTAINMENT, movement schemas IN and OUT are the events that form the
CONTAINMENT schema in the first place. Yet, these concepts can in turn be340
defined as combination of PATH and CONTAINMENT. Adding to injury is that
CONTAINMENT may have many different structures. For instance, (Bennett &
Cialone, 2014) found eight different kinds of CONTAINMENT identifiable in nat-
ural language, and it is not always clear where the borders go between different
image schemas.345
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• The first problem naturally leads to a second, namely the differentiation of a
family of the same image schema and combinations of different image schemas.
We previously already repeatedly mentioned how PATH-following in essence ap-
pears as a “family” of several kinds of movement. One corresponding suggestion
is that image schemas should be structured in a hierarchical fashion to represent350
how image schemas become increasingly complex (cf. Hedblom et al. (2015) for
PATH, and Santiba´n˜ez (2002) for a discussion on OBJECT). Naturally, hierarchi-
cally structuring one image schema family differs from combining completely
different image schemas.
Trying to pinpoint the nature of image schema combinations, we give a few examples.355
It is simple to combine the image schema LINK with PATH into LINKED PATH, as it
is cognitively intuitive to visualise two objects that move together and react to stimuli
in the same way. Based on information transfer of image schemas, this combination is
also used as a means to explain abstract concepts. A real life example is the conceptu-
alisation of the concept “marriage”, where two individuals are taken to go through life360
together (Mandler, 2004). Similarly, PATH can be combined with SUPPORT (or CON-
TAINMENT), resulting in the concept “transportation” (Kuhn, 2007). This is particu-
larly interesting because it illustrates how image schemas become part of the definition
of what concepts are.
Another metaphorical example is the idiom “to hit the wall”. In most contexts,365
this does not mean to physically crash into a wall, but instead implies some form of
mental breakdown, often preceded by long-term stress or exhausting efforts. The idiom
captures the image schema of BLOCKAGE. It is clear that BLOCKAGE is not an atomic
image schema but rather a temporal combination of several ones. Breaking it down,
we have two OBJECTs, at least one PATH, or MOVEMENT ALONG PATH, and at least370
one time point when the two objects are in CONTACT. Connecting it to the idiom we
see how the PATH is related to time and processes that precede the “crash”. This is
one of the most common ways to use image schemas as abstractions as, for example,
is evident from “time is a path”: to conceptualise the abstract notion of time in terms
of the concrete (and sensorially accessible) concept of space.375
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In the next subsection, we will first consider different levels of granularity and
conceptualisation regarding how image schemas can be modelled, before subsequently
developing a concrete example of how image schema combinations may result in more
complex image schemas when seen from a temporal point of view (and, thus, can
represent simple events).380
One process, different perspectives: On distinct levels of modelling image schemas
Based on his research in vision, Marr (1982) famously introduced three levels of
analysis of cognitive information processing systems: a computational level, explain-
ing what a system does in terms of inputs, outputs, and a hypothesised functional map-
ping between them, an algorithmic or representational level, describing precisely how385
the system does what it does (i.e. which representations are used, what processes are
used to build and manipulate the former, etc.), and an implementation or physical level,
specifying the physical implementation of the system. These levels are fundamentally
different from each other and answer different questions concerning the nature and me-
chanics of the system, yet all three are mutually co-determining/co-constraining. For390
research in cognitive science and neuroscience, the Marrian levels have proven to be
highly valuable since they allow researchers to structure their respective studies accord-
ing to the question(s)—and corresponding level(s)—which shall be addressed, and to
interrelate different findings concerning one overall system or capacity to each other
by identifying correspondences across levels.395
In a way analogous to Marr’s introduction of the three levels of cognition, we pro-
pose different levels of computational modelling for image schemas and similar no-
tions from the realm of cognitive theorising for application in AI and cognitive systems
research. Due to their very nature, image schemas can be modelled on several quali-
tatively distinct levels of granularity and detail, each of which corresponds to another400
perspective and addresses one or several different questions.
1. The Third-Level Model: Dynamical modelling, building models describing the
general and abstract dynamics of the system without specifying or taking into
account concrete object properties or empirically-grounded information.
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2. The Second-Level Model: Observational modelling, building models describ-405
ing (some of) the observable/sensorially accessible object, event, and process
properties and dynamics.
3. The First-LevelModel: Qualitative mathematical and physical modelling, build-
ing models involving simplified notions of force dynamics and trying to describe
the underlying object and process properties on an initial level of simplified, ex-410
planatory theory (as commonly done, for instance, in naive physics or qualitative
reasoning).
4. The Zeroth-Level Model: Precise/quantitative mathematical and physical mod-
elling, building detailed simulations involving complex force dynamics and try-
ing to describe and predict the underlying object and process properties as phys-415
ically accurate as possible.
In this hierarchy, the third-level model corresponds to the abstract system dynamics
on a purely conceptual level and, thus, to the hypothesised general notion of image
schemas independent of concrete instantiations. The second-level model corresponds
to what we assume to be the cognitive level of image schemas in that it accounts for420
concrete cases as perceived and experienced, for instance, by a child along its devel-
opmental trajectory (and, thus, supplying the “data” for the hypothesised statistical
inference in concept formation). The first-level model corresponds to a common level
of detail used in AI and cognitive systems when representing physical domains and
reasoning in them. It pays attention to the observable properties and dynamics of the425
domain, in addition introducing governing laws on a naive level adequate for reasoning
about a model’s qualitative evolution but strongly simplified from a purely mathemat-
ical/physical point of view. The zeroth-level model, then, corresponds to the currently
best available accurate model of the respective domain and process, allowing for de-
tailed simulations also targeting precision concerning quantitative aspects.430
While conceptually orthogonal to Marr’s levels, we see similar advantages in the
suggested quadripartition. While on the level of cognitive theorising it seems most
plausible that image schemas in their most general form (among others allowing for
seamless transfer across domains or cases) are best described on the third-level, the
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second- and first-level offer adequate granularities for studies of concrete image schemas435
from a cognitive perspective (second-level) or an AI/cognitive systems point of view
(first-level). Finally, the zeroth-level offers an as-close-as-possible model approxima-
tion to the actual phenomenon as encountered in the world.
Returning to the PATH schema and our declared goal of developing an example for
how image schema combinations may result in models of events, in the following sub-440
section we will now elaborate a second- and first-level model illustrating how the PATH
schema can explain the concepts of BLOCKAGE, BOUNCING, and CAUSED MOVE-
MENT.
The image schema combinations BLOCKAGE, BOUNCING and CAUSED MOVEMENT
In order to explain how image schema combinations model events, we further com-445
bine the PATH schema to explain BLOCKAGE, BOUNCING, and two different forms
of CAUSED MOVEMENT. The latter four concepts can be divided into four different
scenarios.7 They all start at the same situation with MOVEMENT ALONG PATH, but,
dependent on object properties, different outcomes take place. While these are contin-
uous, temporal events, for the sake of simplicity the individual events will be divided450
into (and fixed to) three time points t1, t2, t3. We also need to specify two generic ob-
jects, in our example a circle o1 and a square o2.
The Second-Level Model: Looking at the event structure
The second-level model describes observable properties and dynamics. For read-
ability’s sake, in the following the descriptions of the different events at time points455
t1, t2 and t3 will be given in natural language, but—as obvious from the structure and
level of descriptions—could equally well and without major effort be provided using
high-level modelling languages such as, for example, description logic (or even propo-
sitional logic) theories describing the individual events, and the already previously
mentioned DOL language (Mossakowski et al., 2015) outlining the temporal evolution460
of the model and relations between events.
7There are alternative variations of these scenarios.
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As shown in the concept graph in Figure 2, the succession of events starts at t1 with
a MOVEMENT ALONG PATH schema, corresponding to the circle moving in direction
of the resting square (Figure 3). At t2, the circle reaches and touches the square (Fig-
ure 4), resulting in a CONTACT setting. At this point, at t3 several alternative further465
steps of evolution are possible (corresponding to the branching of the concept graph
on the right-hand side of Figure 2): either the circle comes to rest against the square
in a BLOCKAGE image schema (continuing the setting of Figure 4), the circle bounces
off the (still resting) square in the case of BOUNCING (Figure 5), or one of two forms
of CAUSED MOVEMENT obtains, either with the circle coming to rest and the square470
moving away from it (Figure 6) or with both objects in motion (Figure 7).
Figure 2: A concept graph of the temporal evolution and event structure in the PATH example.
The First-Level Model: Grounding the observed dynamics in a naive physics theory
The previous second-level model gives a description of the observable dynamics
and interactions of the domain elements making up the respective image schemas. In
the following, the high-level conceptualisation is grounded in a fairly expressive and475
detailed first-order logic (FOL) formalisation. While not yet reaching the level of accu-
rate physical theory and force dynamics, the corresponding granularity of description
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Figure 3: At t1: Object o1 is in MOVEMENT ALONG PATH, object o2 is at rest.
Figure 4: At t2: Objects o1 and o2 are in CONTACT
Figure 5: At t3: Bouncing: Object o1 is in (reverse) MOVEMENT ALONG PATH, object o2 at rest at time t3.
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Figure 6: At t3: Caused movement (i): Object o1 is at rest, object o2 is in MOVEMENT ALONG PATH
Figure 7: At t3: Caused movement (ii): Object o1 is in MOVEMENT ALONG PATH, object o2 is in MOVE-
MENT ALONG PATH
allows to perform naive physics reasoning, approximating simple theories about mo-
tion, energy, and interaction of the involved domain elements going beyond the directly
observable realm and providing a first level of explanation.480
In order to handle the differences in sorts between the domain elements, we resort
to a many-sorted FOL language. In terms of modelling approach, we restrict ourselves
to explicitly encoding the observable “external behaviour” of the involved objects as
grounding facts, and relegate the underlying energy and force dynamics to the level of
reasoning and inference conducted by the system. Also, without loss of generality, sev-485
eral simplifying assumptions are made in this example: Each object in motion follows
a respective path p. This object-specific path p is assumed to be determined/defined by
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an oriented notion of kinetic energy (i.e., a notion of directionality is added to the con-
cept of energy), and defines the only relevant spatial dimension (i.e., for each object we
are dealing with a one-dimensional space along the path/trajectory). At each point in490
time each object is charged with at most one type of energy (i.e., energy conversion or
transfer is instantaneous, and energy conversion within an object is absolute), a charge
with elastic energy can externally be observed (e.g., through warming up of the object
or through a deformation in shape), kinetic energy is fully determining motion-related
physical properties such as an object’s velocity, and in absence of external influences495
energy is fully conserved (i.e., the model is loss-free).
In Figure 3, object o1 is moving on the path p towards the second object o2.8 For-
mally this can be represented as shown in Table 1.
In Figure 4, the second time point illustrates how the two objects ‘collide’. This is
an important point because it is here that the image schema of BLOCKAGE comes into500
play. Formally speaking, two interesting changes take place, namely, there is suddenly
contact between the OBJECTs. A formalization is given in Table 2. If t3 is identical to
t2 in terms of spatial configuration of the objects, the MOVEMENT ALONG PATH (o1)
has been hindered and the concept of BLOCKAGE has been demonstrated.
At time point t3, three different (and mutually exclusive) scenarios may take place.505
First, the scene in t3 could be identical to t2, resulting in BLOCKAGE and a conversion
of the kinetic energy of o1 into elastic energy stored in o1 and possibly in o2. This
possibility has been formalized in Table 3.
Alternatively, dependent on the object properties, the kinetic energy may be redi-
rected within the same moving object o1 (resulting in BOUNCING) or (partially or510
entirely transferred to the previously resting object o2 (CAUSED MOVEMENT). In Fig-
ure 5, BOUNCING takes place as the object o1 is still in MOVEMENT ALONG PATH
but on a generally different path p than previously (corresponding in the model to a
8It would also be possible that o2 moves along p as long as it has a velocity lower than o1 or is moving
in the opposite direction. Similar results would occur. The model could remain the same, simply adding a
“velocity correction” by defining the respective kinetic energy of o2 as new zero energy state and from there
on considering the relative kinetic energy of o1 with respect to o2.
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Sorts:
time, object, spatial, energy
Subsorts:
kinetic, elastic : energy path/trajectory : spatial
Entities:
t1 < t2 < t3 : time o1,o2 : object e1: energy p1: path/trajectory
Predicates:
circle, square : object movementAlongPath : object×path/trajectory× time
inFrontOf : object × object × path/trajectory × time energyContent : object × energy × time definesPath :
energy×path/trajectory
energyType : energy× time→{kinetic,elastic} energyValue : energy× time→ real×{N}
Facts of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
circle(o1) energyContent(o1,e1, t1) energyType(e1, t1) = kinetic energyValue(e1, t1) > 0 definesPath(e1, p1)
square(o2)
∀e : energy : ¬energyContent(o2,e, t1)
Laws of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
∀o, o’ : object, t : time,e : energy,p : path/trajectory : (energyContent(o,e, t) ∧ energyType(e, t) = kinetic ∧
energyValue(e, t)> 0∧
∧definesPath(e, p)∧¬inFrontOf(o′,o, p, t))→movementAlongPath(o, p, t)
∀ti, ti+1 : time,o, o’ : object,p : path/trajectory : (movementAlongPath(o, p, ti) ∧ ¬inFrontOf(o′,o, p, ti)) →
movementAlongPath(o, p, ti+1)
Table 1: The situation at time t1 with o1 in MOVEMENT ALONG PATH towards the resting o2, together with
some basic governing laws of the domain.
Additional predicates:
contact : object×object× time
Additional facts of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
inFrontOf(o2,o1, p1, t2)
Additional laws of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
∀o, o’ : object, t : time,e: energy,p : path/trajectory : (movementAlongPath(o, p, t) ∧ inFrontOf(o′,o, p, t)) →
contact(o,o′, t)
∀e : energy,o, o’ : object, ti, ti+1 : time : (energyContent(o,e, ti) ∧ ¬contact(o,o′, ti)) → ∃e′ : energy :
energyContent(o,e′, ti+1)∧
∧ energyType(o,e′, ti+1) = energyType(o,e, ti)∧ energyValue(o,e′, ti+1) = energyValue(o,e, ti)
Table 2: The situation at time t2 in which o1 remains in MOVEMENT ALONG PATH but just established
contact with the still resting o2 (i.e., no transfer or conversion of energy has yet taken place). In case no
contact to another object is established at a certain point in time, kinetic energy (and, consequentially, also
the corresponding MOVEMENT ALONG PATH) remain unaltered.
different path with kinetic energy of same absolute value). The formalisation is given
in Table 4.515
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Additional predicates:
blockage : object×object× time
Additional facts of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
inFrontOf(o2,o1, p1, t3) contact(o1,o2, t3)
Additional laws of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
∀o, o’ : object, ti, ti+1 : time,e: energy,p : path/trajectory : (contact(o,o′, ti)∧ inFrontOf(o′,o, p, ti)∧ contact(o,o′, ti+1)∧
inFrontOf(o′,o, p, ti+1)∧
∧energyContent(o,e, ti)∧energyType(e, ti) = kinetic∧energyValue(e, ti)> 0)→ blockage(o,o′, ti+1)∧ (∃e′,e′′ : energy :
energyContent(o,e′, ti+1)∧
∧ energyType(e′, ti+1) = elastic ∧ energyContent(o′,e′′, ti+1) ∧ energyType(e′, ti+1) = elastic ∧ energyValue((e′ +
e′′), ti+1) = energyValue(e, ti))
Table 3: The situation in which BLOCKAGE comes to be the case, with o1 and o2 in contact and both resting
at time t3 (i.e., all kinetic energy has been converted into elastic energy stored in one or both objects).
Additional facts of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
¬contact(o1,o2, t3)
Additional laws of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
∀o, o’ : object,e, e’ : energy, ti, ti+1 : time : (contact(o,o′, ti)∧ energyContent(o,e, ti)∧ energyType(e, ti) = kinetic∧
∧ energyValue(e, ti) > 0 ∧ ¬contact(o,o′, ti+1) ∧ ¬energyContent(o′,e′, ti+1)) → ∃e′′ : energy, p : path :
energyContent(o,e′′, ti+1)∧
∧ energyType(e′′, ti+1) = kinetic∧ energyValue(e′′, ti+1) = energyValue(e, ti)∧definesPath(e′′, p)
Table 4: The situation with o1 in MOVEMENT ALONG PATH along a (generally different) path p and o2
continuing in a resting state at time t3.
In Figure 6 and 7, the two cases of CAUSED MOVEMENT are represented. They
take place as the energy in o1 is (entirely, as in 6, or partially as in 7) transferred
onto o2 which triggers a MOVEMENT ALONG PATH along a—in general potentially
different—new path p. The final formalisation can be found in Table 5.
Advantages of formalising image schemas revisited520
Besides clarifying the inner structure and the consecutive expansion steps leading
from the basic MOVEMENT ALONG PATH to the more complex schemas, the just ex-
emplified type of formalisation helps to make visible the consequences the modularity
of image schemas has in language. In the same way as image schemas in themselves
can be found in metaphoric expressions (e.g. “fall from grace” (VERTICALITY)), their525
combinations and expansions can embody more complex metaphorical expressions.
For instance, the expressions “to hit the wall” (BLOCKAGE), “to be a sounding board”
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Additional predicates:
inCausedMovement : object× time
Additional facts of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
¬contact(o1,o2, t3)
Additional laws of MOVEMENT ALONG PATH:
∀o, o’ : object,e: energy, ti, ti+1 : time : (contact(o,o′, ti)∧ energyContent(o,e, ti)∧ energyType(e, ti) = kinetic∧
∧ energyValue(e, ti) > 0 ∧ ¬contact(o,o′, ti+1) → ∃e′,e′′ : energy : energyContent(o,e′, ti+1) ∧ energyType(e′, ti+1) =
kinetic∧ energyContent(o′,e′′, ti+1)∧ energyType(e′′, ti+1) = kinetic∧ energyValue((e′+ e′′), ti+1) = energyValue(e, ti)
∀o, o’: object,p,p’,p” : path/trajectory, ti, ti+1 : time : (movementAlongPath(o, p, ti) ∧ ¬movementAlongPath(o′, p′, ti) ∧
inFrontOf(o′,o, p, ti)∧
∧ contact(o,o′, ti)∧movementAlongPath(o′, p′′, ti+1))→ inCausedMovement(o′, ti+1)
Table 5: The situation with o2 in CAUSED MOVEMENT at time t3.
(BOUNCING) and “to set things in motion” (CAUSED MOVEMENT) abstractly encom-
pass not only the original image schemas but also the emergent properties from their
combinations.530
From a cognitive systems- and AI-oriented perspective, formalising image schemas
in a first-level model using many-sorted FOL or similar expressive formalism has the
advantage that these representations offer a reasonable compromise between the re-
quired richness of language—indispensable for modelling the dynamic character and
the, at times, complex inner mechanics underlying more complex schemas—and the535
availability of and integrability with existing systems and approaches. For exam-
ple, using the representation employed in the previous section, the formalised im-
age schemas could directly be interfaced with the Heuristic-Driven Theory Projec-
tion (HDTP) analogy-engine (Schmidt et al., 2014). HDTP has been conceived as
a mathematically sound theoretical model and implemented engine for computational540
analogy-making, computing analogical relations and inferences for domains which are
presented in (possibly different) many-sorted FOL languages: source and target of the
analogy-making process are defined in terms of axiomatisations, i.e., given by a finite
set of formulae. HDTP follows a generalisation-based approach to analogy-making:
given both domains, (restricted) higher-order anti-unification is used to compute a com-545
mon generalisation encompassing structurally shared elements common to both input
domains (mapping phase) and this generalisation then guides the analogical alignment
and knowledge transfer process of unmatched knowledge from the source to the target
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domain used for establishing new hypotheses (transfer phase).
As already stated earlier, image schemas model the skeletal knowledge about a con-550
cept that can be analogically transferred between different domains. HDTP’s generali-
sation-based approach offers a possibility—e.g., through iterated generalisation over
different instantiations of a certain image schema—to explicate this shared skeletal
knowledge and obtain increasingly abstract axiomatisations of the image schema un-
der consideration. Also, HDTP has successfully been used to model concept blending555
on the theory level for abstract domains (Martinez et al., 2014) and concrete domains
(Besold & Plaza, 2015).
Another alternative, suggested by Hedblom et al. (2016) is to handle image schemas
via HETS, a proof management system supporting conceptual blending via colimit
computation (Mossakowski et al., 2007). In similarity to how HDTP would utilise the560
image schematic concepts for analogical reasoning, HETS would use them as generic
space for information transfer in computational conceptual blending and thus, in some
sense, perform formal concept invention. Moreover, HETS is of particular general
interest as a tool to manage entire families of image schemas and their inter-relations.
First, it has full DOL support (including various reasoning engines), which means that565
a large number of well-known KR languages on different levels of expressivity can be
used, and that various qualitative modelling approaches can be employed. Secondly, it
serves as backend to the online theory repository platform Ontohub9, which facilitates
the collection, inter-relation and reasoning with formalised image schemas (Codescu
et al., 2017).570
Similar approaches to the ones just described could be used to automatise the com-
bination between image schemas once the latter have been encoded as shown in the
previous section.
9See https://ontohub.org
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Conclusions and future work
How to represent events, and the relationship to concept formation and concept575
processing in general, is not only a non-trivial problem for understanding developmen-
tal psychology, but also important for AI and cognitive systems research. Embodied
theories of cognition help advance research in AI, computational models of reasoning,
and robotics, as generic conceptual building blocks such as image schemas may be
used to build conceptualisations of concepts and events. Rooted in these ideas, this580
article aimed to—while maintaining the cognitive inspiration—formally illustrate how
image schemas can be combined with one another to model simple events. The image
schemas OBJECT, CONTACT and PATH were combined in a temporal dimension, re-
sulting in the more complex image schemas, and simple events: BLOCKAGE, BOUNC-
ING and CAUSED MOVEMENT. Moreover, this image schematic way of presenting585
events may not only help AI systems to reason about scenarios, but in accordance with
the hypothesised—and increasingly experimentally justified—role of image schemas
in language development, in the long run also could help to improve natural language
comprehension tools.
Natural next steps are to evaluate the work presented here in more complex work-590
flows using systems such as HDTP and HETS, and to provide a fully implemented and
practically evaluable system as proof of concept of how image schema combinations
model simple events and support concept invention. On the level of theory develop-
ment, the proposed hierarchical structure of modelling levels will have to be revisited,
further developed, and evaluated both concerning conceptual ramifications as well as595
practical applications.
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